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Introduction 
New Keynesians models in which a short-run interest rate is the main instrument of 
monetary policy gear to attain an inflation rate target, are currently dominant in the 
academic literature and central bank practice. These models, however, bring back the 
problem of price level determinacy that was once discussed in the context of an interest 
rate peg (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). New Classical and New Keynesian economists 
have tended to favor the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) as a new paradigm of 
price level determination in economies where central banks manipulate a short-run 
interest rate to control inflation (Olivo, 2011). These economists emphasize that the 
quantity theory is not longer valid and that monetary aggregates play no relevant role in 
the determining the behavior of the price level and inflation.  
Woodford (2007) goes further and contents that in the canonical forward looking New 
Keynesian model with a Taylor rule, the price level is completely determined without 
any reference to money or the  FTPL. 
In this paper we share the skepticism of Buiter (1999, 2004) regarding the FTPL, and 
adopt a “Ricardian” view to analyze theoretically and empirically the direct role of the 
short-run interest rate and monetary aggregates in the determination of the price level. 
The paper is organized in three sections. The first develops a forward-looking aggregate 
demand – aggregate supply (AD/AS) model to examine price level determination under 
monetary control and several schemes for setting a short-run interest rate. The second 
section examines critically Woodford (2007) contention that in the standard forward 
looking New Keynesian model with a Taylor rule, the price level is determined without 
any reference to money or the FTPL. The third section presents the results of an 
empirical analysis based on data for seven countries during a period when their central 
banks did not monitor monetary aggregates.  
1.- Price level determinacy in a dynamic aggregate demand – aggregate supply 
model  
To discuss the topic of price level determinacy with and without money, we first rely on 
a basic dynamic closed-economy aggregate demand – aggregate supply (AD-AS) with 
the following structure (Olivo, 2001):  
 
The IS equation is initially expressed as: 
 
t t t ty k f r             (1) 
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Where y is the logarithm of output, k  is a measure of  “normal” productive capacity 
that we assume as exogenous; the variable f measures the real overall fiscal deficit, 
defined as the logarithm of total government expenditure (including interest payments 
on the outstanding debt) less the logarithm of lump-sum taxes (g-t). 
Using the Fisher equation: 
 
1 tttt Eir      (2) 
 
Or equivalently: 
 
)( 1 ttttt ppEir         (2a) 
 
And substituting it into equation (1) yields: 
 
1t t t t t t ty k f i p E p             (3) 
 
Where ti  is the nominal interest rate, tp  is the logarithm of  the price level and 1tt pE  
is the expected value of the logarithm of the price level in period t+1 given the 
information available at period t. 
 
The aggregate supply equation is a Lucas supply function: 
 
)( 1 ttttt pEpky        (4) 
 
1.2.- Price level determinacy with money 
 
The LM equation with all variables in logarithm except the nominal interest rate is 
given as follows: 
 
tttt iypm       (5) 
 
Where tm  is the stock of money. 
 
Solving (5) for ti  yields: 
 
 
)]()[/1( tttt pmyi      (5a) 
 
 
Substituting the LM equation (5a) into the IS equation (3) and solving for the level of 
income, generates the aggregate demand equation: 
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To solve the model for the price level, we assume that economic agents have perfect 
foresight, which implies in the aggregate demand equation that 11   ttt ppE , and in the 
aggregate supply equation that ttt ppE 1  and tt ky  . 
With these assumptions, setting aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply and 
solving for the price level produces: 
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Iterating forward, we get the following expression: 
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This fundamental solution converges if money does not grow too fast relative to 
“normal” productive capacity, given that the global fiscal deficit cannot grow 
permanently. With this condition satisfied and 1)
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the price level is determined by the current and discounted future values of the money 
supply. Thus in a monetary economy, the price level is determined under not very 
restrictive assumptions. This is a result that is consistent with the quantity theory of 
money. 
 
1.2.-Price level indeterminacy under an interest rate peg 
 
To study price level determinacy with an interest rate peg, we use the basic model 
ignoring the LM equation which we substitute for the following condition:  
 
         

 iit  (9) 
 
Replacing (9) in equation (3), we obtain the following specification for the aggregate 
demand equation: 
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1t t t t t ty k f i p E p            (10) 
 
Assuming perfect foresight ( 11   ttt ppE  ; ttt ppE 1 ), equating aggregate demand 
(10) and aggregate supply (2), and solving for tp  : 
 
1)/( 

 ttt pifp    (11) 
 
Iterating forward the solution to this equation is: 
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In equation (12) the term  lim
j
ji

  when 0i  . This implies that this equation does 
not converge toward a definite value of  tp when the nominal interest rate is pegged at a 
positive value. Even with  0i  equation (12) does not provide a definite solution for tp  
because the terminal  condition 1lim t j
j
p  

depends on the trajectory of the prices 
, 0,1,...,t jp j   which is not determined. This result accords with that obtained by 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) in their model with rational expectations. 
 
1.3.-Price level indeterminacy under an interest rate rule 
 
To study price level determinacy with a forward-looking interest rate rule, we use the 
basic model ignoring the LM equation which we substitute for the following reaction 
function of the monetary authority:  
 
         
1; 1t t ti i E  

    (13) 
 
Where i

is the “natural”,  “neutral” or long-run nominal interest, and 1t tE   can be 
interpreted as the deviation of expected inflation with respect to a zero inflation target.  
Replacing (13) in equation (3), we obtain the following specification for the aggregate 
demand equation: 
1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t ty k f i p E p                (14) 
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Assuming perfect foresight ( 11   ttt ppE  ; ttt ppE 1 ), equating aggregate demand 
(11) and aggregate supply (2), and solving for tp  : 
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Iterating forward the solution to this equation is: 
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In equation (16) the term  lim
j
ji

  when 0i  . This implies that this equation does 
not converge toward a definite value of  tp when the nominal “natural” interest rate is a 
positive value. Even with  0i  equation (16) does not provide a definite solution for tp  
because the terminal  condition 1lim t j
j
p  

depends on the trajectory of the prices 
, 0,1,...,t jp j   which is not determined. Thus in the context of the dynamic AD-AS 
model, a forward-looking interest rate rule produces the same result with respect to 
price level determination to that obtained with an interest rate peg. 
 
1.4.-The Wicksell – Woodford policy regime 
 
Woodford (2003) shows that under what he calls a Wicksellian policy rule, the rational 
expectations equilibrium paths of prices and interest rates are (locally) determinate. 
A log-linear approximation to the Wicksellian policy rule can be expressed as follows: 
 
          )( *1 ttt ppi     ;  0 1   (17) 
 
Replacing (17) in (3) and assuming perfect foresight yields the following expression for 
the aggregate demand function:
   
 
 
1
* )1(  tttttt pppfky     (18) 
 
Setting aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply and solving for tp , we get: 
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1
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Iterating forward yields the following solution: 
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This fundamental solution converges if the price level target does not grow too fast, 
given that the global fiscal deficit cannot grow permanently.   With this condition 
satisfied  and (1 ) 1  , 0)1(lim 1
1  


jt
j
j
p , the price level is effectively 
determined by the current and future discounted target price levels .
1
  
 
1.5.-Discussion of the results with the AD-AS model 
 
Although interest rate pegging and a forward-looking interest rate rule in terms of 
expected inflation leaves the price level indeterminate, Woodford (2003) shows that 
there may be a well-defined rational-expectations equilibrium path for the price level, 
even in a purely cashless economy, under an interest rate policy rule that is formulated 
in terms of the deviations of the expected price level with respect to a target price level 
— the Wicksell-Woodford policy regime—.  
We raise two objections to Woodford (2003) contention. The first is that among the 
monetary policy strategies proposed by the New Keynesian, the ones that are actually 
implemented by central banks are those based on inflation rate targets, not price level 
targets.  Second, actual economies are not cashless economies. Thus, the possibility of a 
determinate price level under an interest rate rule does not exclude that it is actually the 
evolution of money what determines the price level. Therefore, we believe that this 
question cannot be answered by theoretical models alone, but requires empirical testing. 
2.-Price level determinacy in a basic New Keynesian Model 
We use Woodford (2007) presentation to discuss price level determinacy in the New 
Keynesian (NK) framework. Woodford (2007) model is composed by two equations 
plus a Taylor rule: 
                                                 
1
 With 1<ϕ<2, the Wicksell-Woodford rule also produces price level determinacy in the AD-AS 
model, but with oscillations. 
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1 1( )
n
t t t t t t ty E y i E r      (1) 
11( )tt t t t tky u          (2) 
* ( )t t t t t y ti r y         (3) 
Where: 
y  output gap; the log difference between  observed output and  natural output. 
  inflation rate 
  perceived rate of trend inflation=the central bank´s inflation target 
i  short-run nominal interest rate; the riskless rate generated by a money market 
instrument held between periods t and 1t  .  
nr  the natural “wicksellian” real interest rate. 
*r  central bank´s perception of the natural real rate 
Assuming that both t and 
*
tr are exogenous processes – the evolution of which 
represent shifts in attitudes within the central bank taken to be independent of what is 
happening with inflation or real activity–, and the Taylor principle holds, the following 
solution for equilibrium inflation is obtained: 
*
0
n
t t j t t j t j
j
E r r  

 

      (4) 
According to Woodford (2007), this shows how inflation is determined by the inflation 
target of the central bank, and by current and expected future discrepancies between the 
natural rate of interest and the perception of the central bank of this rate. “So the model 
does imply a determinate inflation rate”.  Moreover, given an initial price level, 
Woodford (2007) argues that the model implies a determinate path for the price level. If 
0t is the first period in which the policy begins to be implemented, a higher price level 
0t
P will correspond to a higher inflation rate 
0
t that will generate a higher interest rate 
target from the central bank. Given the value of 
0 1t
P  , which is at 0t a historical fact, 
there is a uniquely determined equilibrium value for  
0t
P , and similarly for tP in any 
period 0t t . 
Nelson (2003) have pointed out that the NK model assumption that the steady-state 
inflation rate   is an exogenous variable, implies that it only can explain the deviation 
of observed inflation with respect to its steady-state value. Nelson (2003) argues that the 
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steady-state inflation rate is not an exogenous variable, but is determined by the steady-
state growth rate of money in the economy. Hence, Friedman contention that inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, continues to be valid in the NK 
model. A corollary of this discussion is that because the NK model can only determine 
deviations of the actual inflation rate relative to its steady-state value, it cannot explain 
either the steady-state or trend price level. At most, it could determine the deviations of 
the observed price level with respect to its steady-state trajectory. 
In addition, Woodford (2007) story of how the NK model can determine the price level, 
assumes that 
0 1t
P   and previous values of the price level are a historical fact when the 
monetary policy regime based on a Taylor rule is introduced. The question here is how 
the introduction of the Taylor rule in period 0t invalidates the process that determined 
0 1t
P   and previous price levels. 
3.-Empirical analysis 
In this section we try to assess empirically the relative importance of money against 
interest rate in explaining the evolution of the price level in six countries: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States. We first pool 
quarterly data for these countries for different periods, and then proceed to a country by 
country analysis. 
The selection of these countries was primarily motivated by the fact that their central 
banks have given little consideration to monetary aggregates in their monetary policy 
strategies during the period under study. Five of them are inflation targeters: Australia 
adopted  Inflation Targeting (IT)  in 1993; Canada in 1991; Chile in 1991; Korea in 
1997; and New Zealand in 1989.  In the United States the FED has kept its tradition of 
not binding its monetary policy strategy to any specific framework. A second criterion 
for the choice of countries was data availability. 
We obtained quarterly data up to 2007 from the IMF-IFS data base to reduce potential 
inconsistencies in the information for the different countries. 
For the price level (P), we rely on the consumer price indexes with 2000 as the base 
year. For the monetary aggregates, we construct indexes with 2000 as the base year for 
the monetary base (or Reserve Money in the IMF-IFS terminology), M1 (money in the 
banking survey), and M2 (money plus quasi money in the banking survey). For the 
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interest rate, we employ the money market interest rate when available.
2
 In the 
econometric estimations, we include the price level and monetary aggregates data in 
logarithms. 
 
3.1.-Panel data analysis 
We use the following panel unit root tests available in EViews (Appendix 1): Levin, 
Lin, Chu; Breitung (Common root); Im, Pesaran, Shin; Fisher - ADF; and Fisher - PP 
(Individual roots). All unit root tests applied to our unbalanced panel indicates that the 
log of the price level, including individual linear trends, is stationary at statistical 
significance levels below 10%. In the case of monetary aggregates, only the log of the 
M1index (LIM1), including individual linear trends, is stationary according to all panel 
unit root tests, except Breitung. The log of the M2 index (LIM2) and the monetary base 
(LIRM) contain a unit root according to all the tests that we employ, even including 
individual linear trends. For the nominal money market rate is possible to reject the null 
of a unit root with all the tests, with only individual effects.   
Given these results, we estimate a simple dynamic equation and a VAR model relating 
the logarithm of the price level (LP), the logarithm of the M1index (LIM1), and the 
money market interest rate (I).  
Estimation of an equation for LP with fixed cross-section coefficients using GMM, 
generates the results shown in Table 1. In this case we find that the coefficient LIM1 is 
positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of the money market interest 
rate (I) is statistically different from zero, but positive. This last result reflects the 
presence of the so-called “price puzzle” (Walsh, 2010) regarding the effect of the 
interest rate on the price level, which have been reported by several authors.  Inclusion 
of the output gap generates a negative and not significant coefficient, and does not alter 
the aforementioned results for the other variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 In the case of Chile, we use the average discount rate until 2000 when data of the money market rate is 
available.   
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Table 1 
Dependent Variable: LP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Date: 04/11/11   Time: 18:20   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q1 2007Q4  
Periods included: 72   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 358  
2SLS instrument weighting matrix  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Instrument specification: C LP(-2) LP(-3) LP(-4) LIM1(-1) LIM1(-2) LIM1(-3) 
        LIM1(-4) I(-1) I(-2) I(-3) I(-4)  
Constant added to instrument list  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.041958 0.025204 1.664775 0.0969 
LIM1 0.005539 0.001034 5.358176 0.0000 
I 0.000740 0.000235 3.149126 0.0018 
LP(-1) 0.985820 0.005749 171.4778 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.998068    Mean dependent var 4.608627 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998024    S.D. dependent var 0.119389 
S.E. of regression 0.005307    Sum squared resid 0.009829 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.721673    J-statistic 25.02424 
Instrument rank 17    
     
     
 
 
We also estimate a Panel VAR with fixed coefficients and five lags (Appendix 2). The 
panel VAR includes the relevant variables in the following order: I, LIM1, LYG, LP. 
From the impulse-response functions —using the Cholesky decomposition—, we find 
that a positive shock (one standard error) to the money market interest rate has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the price level (LP) — the “price 
puzzle”—. Shocks to LIM1 and the output gap (LYG) have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the price level as expected. It is important to note that using the 
Generalized impulse-response functions do not change these results substantially.  
Thus in general, the results obtained with our panel data indicate that money seems to 
have a clearer influence on the price level than the money market interest rate.  
3.2.-Time series analysis 
Although the panel data analysis allowed us to dispose of a much larger sample with its 
econometric advantages, it also may hide non trivial differences in the data of each of 
the six countries we are studying. For this reason, we also try to analyze the data for 
each country separately. As in the panel data analysis, we begin with simple regression 
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models and then move to VAR models. Results in this case should be interpreted with 
care due to the relatively small samples available. 
a) Australia 
In the case of Australia, we find that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
LP contains a unit root using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), 
and Zivot-Andrews (ZV one break) tests.  In contrast, for LIM1 and the interest rate (I), 
it is possible to reject the null that they contain a unit root. Thus, a cointegration 
relationship between the log price level and these variables does not exist. Only for 
LIRM and LIM2 it is not possible to reject the null that they contain a unit root based on 
ADF, PP, and ZV tests (Appendix 3).  
Given these results, we test for a cointegration relationship between LP and LIM2. We 
obtained the best results by including the log of M2 velocity, which is not stationary, in 
the cointegration relation: 
Table2 
Dependent Variable: LP_AUS   
Method: Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) 
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:34   
Sample (adjusted): 1993Q3 2007Q4  
Included observations: 58 after adjustments  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C   
Long-run covariance estimate (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth 
        = 4.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LIM2_AUS 0.571406 0.050888 11.22862 0.0000 
LV2_AUS 0.897753 0.158381 5.668309 0.0000 
C 2.839760 0.087654 32.39735 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.984295    Mean dependent var 4.627687 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983724    S.D. dependent var 0.112562 
S.E. of regression 0.014361    Sum squared resid 0.011342 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.330366    Long-run variance 0.000413 
     
     
 
 
The Engle-Granger test on the residuals of this equation indicates that they are 
stationary at a 5% level of statistical significance. 
Thus for Australia, we find evidence that money cointegrates with the price level, with 
an elasticity coefficient of 0.57. We could not find, however, a cointegration 
relationship between the price level and Reserve Money, despite both being I(1).  
Additionally, we estimate a VAR model for Australia with six lags and the following 
order of the relevant variables: I, LIM1 and LP (Appendix 4). It was not possible to 
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obtain a stable VAR including LIM2.Also, the inclusion of the output gap made the 
VAR model unstable.  
A one standard deviation shock to the money market rate (I) has a positive impact on 
the price level (the “price puzzle”), although it is not statistically significant. A one 
standard deviation shock to LIM1 has a positive shock on the logarithm of the price 
level, but this effect is only significant at the very beginning of the forecast period.  The 
generalized impulse response functions suggest that the previous results do not depend 
substantially on the ordering of the variables imposed on the model. In general, the 
results from the VAR model suggest that money has a weak impact on the 
determination of the price level, while the money market rate has no discernable effect. 
b) Canada 
In the case of Canada, we find that for the log of the price level (LP) we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that it contains a unit root with any of the tests employed. For the 
log of the monetary aggregates the null of a unit-root can be rejected: for LIRM with the 
PP test, and for LIM1 and LIM2 with the ZV test. For the money market interest rate 
(I), the null of a unit root can be rejected using the ADF and PP tests including only an 
intercept term . These results imply, that in principle, we cannot establish a robust 
empirical relationship between the price level and the relevant variables for Canada 
(Appendix 3).  
We can still, however, use a VAR model and analyze the impulse- response functions. 
We estimate a VAR model with three lags and the following order of the variables: the 
money market interest rate (I), LIM1, the output gap (LYG), and LP.  
The impulse response functions (Appendix 5) indicate that a one standard deviation 
shock to the money market rate (I) has no significant effect on the log of the price level. 
A one standard deviation shock to LIM1 has a positive but statistically insignificant 
impact on the log of the price level. A one standard deviation shock to the output gap 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the price level. 
The results are very similar using Reserve Money, but with M2 it was not possible to 
obtain a stable VAR model. When using the Generalized impulse-response functions, 
the results are not substantially different. . 
Thus in general, we conclude that for Canada neither the money market interest rate or 
LIM1 have a relevant influence on the price level. We find the results for Canada  
puzzling.  
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c) Chile 
In Chile the log of the price level (LP) is stationary including a time trend according to 
the PP test. The ADF and PP tests indicate that the log of M1 (LIM1) is stationary 
including a time trend. The logs of Reserve Money (LIRM) and M2 (LIM2) contain a 
unit root according to the ADF, PP, and ZV tests. Both the ADF and PP tests suggest 
that the money market rate (I) is stationary with only an intercept term. (Appendix 3).  
With these results, we estimate a dynamic equation of the logarithm of the price level 
(LP) against the logarithm of the M1 index (LIM1), and the money market interest rate. 
After eliminating the variables with coefficients with p-values greater than 0.2 
sequentially, we obtain the following results: 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: LP_CHI   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/11   Time: 16:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1994Q2 2007Q4  
Included observations: 55 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.200984 0.087120 2.306992 0.0255 
LIM1_CHI(-2) 0.026087 0.006334 4.118485 0.0002 
I_CHI 0.000905 0.000312 2.901058 0.0056 
I_CHI(-1) -0.000566 0.000300 -1.887901 0.0652 
I_CHI(-2) 0.000830 0.000276 3.012389 0.0042 
LP_CHI(-1) 1.261941 0.120100 10.50746 0.0000 
LP_CHI(-2) -0.745466 0.191676 -3.889200 0.0003 
LP_CHI(-3) 0.413541 0.128152 3.226948 0.0023 
     
     R-squared 0.999066    Mean dependent var 4.595969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998927    S.D. dependent var 0.149256 
S.E. of regression 0.004890    Akaike info criterion -7.669466 
Sum squared resid 0.001124    Schwarz criterion -7.377490 
Log likelihood 218.9103    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.556556 
F-statistic 7179.729    Durbin-Watson stat 2.034965 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
The coefficient of LIM1 is positive and statistically different from zero as expected, 
while the sum of the coefficients of the short-run interest rate (I) is positive and 
significantly different from zero (the “price puzzle”). The coefficient of the output gap 
(LYG) contemporaneous or lagged one period was not statistically significant.  
We also estimate a VAR model with four lags and the relevant variables in the 
following order: I, LIM1, LP (Appendix 6). We exclude the output gap to obtain a 
stable VAR. 
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We find that a one standard deviation shock to the money market rate has a positive 
impact on the price level that is significant at the beginning of the forecast period (the 
“price puzzle”). A one standard deviation shock to LIM1 has a positive impact on LP 
that is initially not significant, but as the forecast period advances it turns significant. 
Using the Generilized impulse-response functions instead of the Cholesky 
decomposition, we notice that the results do not change substantially, though the impact 
of a shock to money on LP is weaker.  
In general in the case of Chile, we conclude that the price level seems to be more 
closely related to M1 than to the short-interest rate manipulated by the central bank.  
d) Korea 
For Korea the unit-root tests (Appendix 3) indicate that LP is stationary using the ADF 
with a linear trend. The log of Reserve Money (LIRM) and M1 (LIM1) are stationary 
according to both ADF and PP tests; LIM2 contains a unit root even when we apply the 
ZV test that considers a one-brake. The money market rate (I) is stationary according to 
the ADF test including only an intercept . 
Given the results from the unit-root tests, we estimate a dynamic equation for the 
logarithm of the price level (LP), the logarithm of the Reserve Money index (LIRM), 
and the money market interest rate (I).  After trimming down the non significant 
coefficients, we obtain the results in Table 4. The coefficient of LIRM lagged one 
period is positive and statistically significant. The sum of the coefficients of the money 
market interest rate (I) is positive and statistically different from zero (the “price 
puzzle”). The coefficient of the output gap contemporaneous or lagged one period is not 
statistically relevant.  
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable: LP_KOR   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/11   Time: 17:27   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2007Q4  
Included observations: 42 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.195369 0.124981 1.563188 0.1268 
LIRM_KOR(-1) 0.026659 0.012517 2.129829 0.0401 
I_KOR 0.002721 0.000490 5.550771 0.0000 
I_KOR(-1) -0.001481 0.000519 -2.854898 0.0071 
LP_KOR(-1) 0.724132 0.131668 5.499695 0.0000 
LP_KOR(-2) 0.207140 0.123830 1.672776 0.1030 
     
     R-squared 0.996772    Mean dependent var 4.682006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996323    S.D. dependent var 0.091365 
S.E. of regression 0.005540    Akaike info criterion -7.422089 
Sum squared resid 0.001105    Schwarz criterion -7.173851 
Log likelihood 161.8639    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.331100 
F-statistic 2223.090    Durbin-Watson stat 2.145803 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
We estimate a VAR system with four lags and the relevant variables in the following 
order: I, LIRM, LYG, LP (Appendix 7) . 
The impulse –response functions indicate that a one standard deviation shock to the 
short-term interest rate has a positive and statistically significant influence on LP at the 
beginning of the forecast period (the “Price Puzzle”). A shock to Reserve Money has a 
positive but no statistically significant impact on LP. A one standard deviation shock to 
the output gap (LYG) exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect on the price 
level (LP) at the beginning of the forecast period . 
In general, we interpret the results for Korea as indicating that money has a clearer 
influence on the price level than the short-run interest, though in the VAR model only 
the output gap presents a consistent effect on the price level.    
e) New Zealand 
The data from New Zealand indicates that the log of the price level is stationary 
according to both ADF and PP tests, including a linear trend. The logs of Reserve 
Money and M1 are stationary when we apply a ZV test, while LIM2 contains a unit root 
according to all tests. The ADF test indicates that the money market interest rate (I) is 
stationary including only an intercept. (Appendix 3). 
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We then estimate a dynamic equation of the logarithm of the price level (LP) against the 
the logarithm of  the Reserve Money index (LIRM), and the money market rate (I). 
After eliminating non-significant coefficients, we obtain: 
Table 5 
Dependent Variable: LP_NEZ   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/11   Time: 18:17   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q1 2007Q4  
Included observations: 72 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.055861 0.042997 1.299173 0.1985 
LIRM_NEZ(-2) 0.003285 0.001905 1.724629 0.0893 
I_NEZ 0.000905 0.000601 1.505908 0.1369 
I_NEZ(-1) 0.001479 0.000887 1.667821 0.1002 
I_NEZ(-2) -0.002308 0.000558 -4.137506 0.0001 
LP_NEZ(-1) 1.085089 0.050268 21.58604 0.0000 
LP_NEZ(-4) -0.099766 0.052623 -1.895855 0.0624 
     
     R-squared 0.999001    Mean dependent var 4.593457 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998909    S.D. dependent var 0.105307 
S.E. of regression 0.003479    Akaike info criterion -8.392062 
Sum squared resid 0.000787    Schwarz criterion -8.170720 
Log likelihood 309.1142    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.303945 
F-statistic 10832.08    Durbin-Watson stat 2.046214 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
The coefficient of LIRM(-2) is statistically significant at a 10% level (p-value 0.09). 
The sum of the coefficients of the money market interest rate is positive and 
significantly different from zero (p value=0.1066), contrary to what we expect 
theoretically (the “price puzzle”). 
We estimate a VAR model with two lags and the variables in the following order: I, 
LIRM, LYG, and LP (Appendix 8). We also include a dummy variable for 2005.Q1 as 
an exogenous variable.  
In this VAR a one standard deviation shock to the money market rate (I) has a positive 
but statistically non significant impact on the price level (LP). A one standard deviation 
shock to LIRM has a positive but statistically non significant effect on LP. A one 
standard deviation shock to the output gap (LYG) has a positive impact on LP that is 
statistically significant for several periods of the forecast horizon. The results do not 
vary markedly with the generalized impulse-response functions.  
Thus for New Zealand, we find evidence that monetary aggregates have a more 
consistent impact on the price level than the short-run interest rate with a single 
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equation, but with a VAR model only the output gap exhibits an influence on the price 
level.  
f) United States 
The data for the United States indicates that the log of the price level is stationary 
according to both the ADF and PP tests, including a linear trend. The log of Reserve 
Money is stationary with the PP test considering a linear trend, while the log of M1 is 
stationary according to the ADF test (with a linear trend), and the PP test (without a 
linear trend). All tests employed suggest that the log of M2 contains a unit-root. The 
ADF test indicates that money market rate is stationary, including only an intercept. 
(Appendix 3). 
Given this analysis of the individual series, we estimate the following dynamic model of 
the logarithm of the price level (LP) against the logarithm of the Reserve Money index 
(LIRM), and the money market interest rate: 
Table 6 
Dependent Variable: LP_USA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/12/11   Time: 11:14   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q1 2007Q4  
Included observations: 72 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.122423 0.071025 1.723655 0.0896 
LIRM_USA(-2) 0.016554 0.010608 1.560467 0.1236 
I_USA(-1) 0.001851 0.001032 1.792759 0.0777 
I_USA(-2) -0.001468 0.001026 -1.430613 0.1574 
LP_USA(-1) 1.250419 0.116728 10.71225 0.0000 
LP_USA(-2) -0.716581 0.168685 -4.248040 0.0001 
LP_USA(-3) 0.870092 0.176446 4.931204 0.0000 
LP_USA(-4) -0.446287 0.118929 -3.752559 0.0004 
     
     R-squared 0.999345    Mean dependent var 4.565371 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999273    S.D. dependent var 0.134864 
S.E. of regression 0.003637    Akaike info criterion -8.291015 
Sum squared resid 0.000846    Schwarz criterion -8.038052 
Log likelihood 306.4765    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.190309 
F-statistic 13939.24    Durbin-Watson stat 1.936542 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 In this case the coefficient of LIRM(-2) is positive and statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.12, while the sum of  the coefficients of the money market  interest rate is not 
significantly different from zero. 
For the US economy we estimate a VAR model with four lags and the variables in the 
following order: I, LIRM, LYG, and LP (Appendix 9). 
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A one standard deviation shock to the money market rate (I) presents a positive, but not 
statistically significant effect on LP. A one standard deviation shock to Reserve Money 
(LIRM) exhibits a positive impact on LP, but this effect only becomes statistically 
significant with a considerable lag during the forecast horizon. A one standard deviation 
shock to the output gap has a positive, but not statistically significant impact on LP. 
These results do not change substantially when the Generalized impulse-response 
functions are used.  
From these results we conclude that for the United States, money exhibits a more 
consistent influence on the price level than the money market rate. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the issue of price level determinacy from a theoretical and 
empirical perspective.  In this study we adopt the  “Ricardian” view that holds that the 
inter-temporal government budget constraint is always satisfied.  
From a theoretical point of view, the dynamic aggregate-demand – aggregate-supply 
(AD-AS) model that we use, produces the typical results that control of a monetary 
aggregate generates price level determinacy under conditions that are not very 
restrictive, while under an interest rate peg the price level is indeterminate. An interest 
rate rule that reacts to expected inflation also leaves the price level indeterminate in the 
AD-AS framework. Only the Woodford-Wicksell interest rate rule is consistent with 
price level determinacy, but central banks in practice follow inflation targets not price 
level targets as this rules formulates.  We also discuss critically the conclusions with 
respect to price level determinacy in the canonical New Keynesian model as presented 
by Woodford (2007). We believe that Woodford arguments with respect to price level 
determinacy in this model are not robust. Particularly, his reasoning does not discard the 
possibility that the price level is still determined by the behavior of the money supply, 
even if a Taylor-type interest rule is being implemented by the central bank. 
From an empirical point of view, we try to assess the relative importance of money 
against interest rate in explaining the evolution of the price level in six countries: 
Australia, Canada, Chile, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States. We first 
pool quarterly data for these countries for different periods up to 2007, and then proceed 
to a country by country analysis. The selection of these countries was primarily 
motivated by the fact that their central banks have given little consideration to monetary 
aggregates in their monetary policy strategies during the period under study.  
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We find in our single equation models —with panel data and individual countries’ 
series— that monetary aggregates have, in most cases, positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the price level: Panel (M1), Australia (M2), Chile (M1), Korea 
(Reserve Money), New Zealand (Reserve Money), and the USA (Reserve Money).  The 
short-run interest rate frequently exhibits a positive and statistically significant 
influence on the price level consistent with the “price puzzle”: Chile, Korea, and New 
Zealand.  
The VAR model with panel data shows in the impulse –response function analysis the 
presence of the “price puzzle” phenomenon. In the VAR models for individual 
countries, the “price puzzle” is statistically significant in the cases of Chile and Korea. 
In the panel VAR model a shock to money measured through M1 presents a positive 
and statistically significant influence on the price level. In the VAR models for 
individual countries, shocks to the different measures of money that we employ 
(Reserve Money, M1, and M2) always have a positive impact on the price level, but this 
influence is only statistically significant in the cases of Chile (M1) and the United States 
(Reserve Money).  
It is also interesting to point out that the VAR models with panel data and for individual 
countries show a very weak response of the short-run interest rate to shocks to the price 
level.  
Our general conclusion is that, though the time span of our empirical models is not 
enough for a long-run analysis, they capture a glimpse of the operation of the Quantity 
Theory. Thus we content that the Quantity Theory continues to be relevant and that 
monetary policy strategies should not ignore completely the behavior of monetary 
aggregates (Issing, 2011). 
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Appendix 
 
1.- Unit-root tests panel data 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  LP    
Date: 05/24/11   Time: 11:32  
Sample: 1989Q1 2007Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.27748  0.0114  6  369 
Breitung t-stat -2.09804  0.0180  6  363 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.59498  0.0554  6  369 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  20.7979  0.0534  6  369 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  32.1633  0.0013  6  376 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  LIM1   
Date: 05/24/11   Time: 11:31  
Sample: 1989Q1 2007Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 8 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.46020  0.0069  6  359 
Breitung t-stat -0.72128  0.2354  6  353 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.53866  0.0056  6  359 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  24.8478  0.0156  6  359 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  40.2532  0.0001  6  376 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  I    
Date: 05/25/11   Time: 18:54  
Sample: 1989Q1 2007Q4   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 1 to 7 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.80213  0.0001  6  364 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.50348  0.0000  6  364 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  42.8898  0.0000  6  364 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  34.5726  0.0005  6  376 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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2.- Panel data VAR 
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3.- Unit-root tests time series individual countries 
Australia 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -1.47 -1.88 -3.82 
LIRM -2.62 -2.62 -3.82 
LIM1 -3.63 ** -2.31  
LIM2 1.65 3.23 0 
I -3.03 **
 
-2.08  
 
Canada 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -1.73 -1.73 -3.76 
LIRM -2.30 -8.26 *  
LIM1 -2.17 -2.02 -5.36 ** 
LIM2 -2.02 -2.07 -12.28 * 
I -3.59 *
 
-3.48 **  
 
Chile 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -2.77 -4.53 *  
LIRM -2.29 -2.18 -3.06 
LIM1 -3.26 *** -6.81 *  
LIM2 -1.92 -1.92 -3.26 
I -3.11 **
 
-4.23 *  
 
Korea 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -3.21 *** -3.17  
LIRM -4.03 ** -4.08 **  
LIM1 -3.42 *** -4.07 **  
LIM2 -0.83 -0.55 0 
I -2.70 ***
 
-1.81  
 
New Zealand 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -3.29 *** -3.42 ***  
LIRM -2.02 -1.45 -5.20 ** 
LIM1 -2.07 -1.77 -4.14 *** 
LIM2 -1.42 -1.29 -3.04 
I -2.95 **
 
-2.33  
 
USA 
 DF PP ZA 
LP -3.66 ** -4.03 **  
LIRM -1.26 -3.86 **  
LIM1 -3.29 *** -2.34  
LIM2 -0.95 -1.05 -3.21 
I -3.43 **
 
-2.45  
*** 10%; ** 5%; * 1% 
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4.- VAR Australia 
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5.- VAR Canada 
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